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Abstract
Since their inception, 802.11 wireless networks have been plagued by a wide range of security problems. These
problems relate to both data security and denial of service attacks, and there have been many solutions created
by different vendors address these problems. However, the number of different types of attack, and the many
possible solutions, makes it a difficult task to put in place an appropriate wireless network security policy. Such
a policy must address both the size and nature of the enterprise, and the resources available to it. Measures such
as WEP and MAC filtering are only appropriate for home users, and WPA should be used instead. Larger
organisations can benefit from using 802.1x/EAP, RADIUS authentication and AES encryption. However, the
wireless segment of a network should always be considered unsafe.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the newer technologies being increasingly used in today's business is that of wireless networks. While this
technology has the advantages of providing greater user mobility and temporary access, it does have the
disadvantage of an intrinsic lack of security. The security risks are mostly the same as for wired networks, such
as loss of intellectual property. However, the wireless medium, brings with it new risks, such as theft of Internet
bandwidth (Coursey 2004), which can be a considerable amount of money, particularly for a small-business, or
loss of intellectual property. Since their inception, the 802.11 wireless network protocols have been plagued by
in-built security flaws. These flaws range from problems with the Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) encryption
system, through to full-scale active denial of service attacks which aim to capture data from a victim. There are
two aspects of wireless networks which lead to this insecurity.
The first aspect is that it is a broadcast medium, meaning that the information is effectively broadcast and
propagated over a wide area with a suitably equipped entity within the signal locus capable of capturing this
information.
The second is embedded vulnerabilities in the modus operandi of the actual 802.11 protocol. The inability to
verify management and control frames is one such vulnerability, leaving the network susceptible to Denial of
Service (DoS) and man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks (Woodward 2004a). The most publicised of the wireless
security problems is the implementation of WEP, allowing it to be compromised with relative ease (Walker
2000; Fluhrer et al 2001). Although there are a plethora of solutions available to these and other wireless
security problems, the biggest problem facing IT security managers is which of these solutions are appropriate
for their business. Many of the solutions proposed, or available, are not necessarily relevant to all levels of
business. Basic solutions, such as MAC address filtering or SSID masking, are feasible to the home or possibly
small-business user with limited numbers of wireless devices. On the other hand, the solutions which are more
secure and appropriate for a larger enterprise are financially and technically cumbersome for the smaller business
or home user. The problem then, is one of knowing which solution is right for the size of the organisation.
This paper will briefly look at the types of security threats that IS managers are likely to face, and then look at a
range of available solutions. A brief analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of each solution will be
provided and guidelines given as to where each of these countermeasures is appropriate to use. Finally, policies
for appropriate use of the wireless network and equipment will be suggested for the spectrum of wireless users.

SECURITY THREATS
There are a number of types of attack that wireless LANs are vulnerable to, based on different aspects of their
operation and configuration. These will be briefly addressed here.

Broadcast medium
The functionality of wireless network presents one of its biggest problems. Because wireless is a broadcast
medium, there is no way to control where the information is sent and who therefore has access to it. By
modifying the drivers used with the wireless client devices, many individuals and organisations have developed
analysis tools, known as “sniffers”. When used within the broadcast range of a wireless network, these can be
used to capture every packet travelling the wireless network. If an access point is set up and used in its default
configuration, then the user of such a system is vulnerable to attack, because anyone running sniffer software can
see and capture everything that a user does across that network. Another problem with the broadcast medium is
that the range is not only dictated by the transmitter, but also by the receiver. Effective range of the wireless
network is an intersection of where the two antenna coverage patterns overlap. An attacker can increase the
distance at which they can perform an attack simply by using a larger antenna. Depending on the antenna type
used, the range is only limited by the ability to obtain line of sight between attacker and victim.
WEP Vulnerabilities.
One of the earliest security problems with 802.11 wireless networks is that relating to the problems with the
WEP protocol. Although the system was never meant to absolutely protect data traversing the wireless network,
there was the expectation that it would be more robust than it turned out to be. There were two problems with the
original WEP encryption system.
Firstly, was the way in which it was implemented in the shared key authentication system. The shared key
system requires the use of the WEP key to verify a user attempting to connect to the wireless network. The
problem is that during the authentication process, the key is made vulnerable, due to both encrypted and
unencrypted versions of the challenge text being transmitted. A malicious user can easily capture this information
and use it to derive the WEP key in an offline mode. This key is the same one which is used to protect data as it
travel the wireless network.
The second was the actual implementation of the encryption system itself. The use of a relatively small
initialisation vector (IV) means that in a high traffic environment, the IV is likely to be repeated more than once
during a day. This repetition of the IV, makes it easy for an attacker to bypass the encryption system. There are
now many other systems and measures available to protect and encrypt data and some these will be discussed
later in this work.
Denial of Service
This type of attack can be perpetrated in one of two ways. It can either be conducted through the use of a
jamming technique, or by exploiting the OSI Layer Two vulnerabilities that exist within that the 802.11 protocol
suite. The first type of attack, that of jamming, is fairly easy to perpetrate, and also reasonably difficult to detect.
A jamming attack can be either intentional or unintentional. An intentional attack is one in which the attacker
broadcasts a very high-power signal at the same frequency that the wireless network is operating on, causing
interference to the network (Hoad and Jones 2004). The likelihood of this type of attack being conducted is fairly
low as there are no real benefits to an attacker. This type of attack may also occur unintentionally, through the
action of placing a device which operates at the same frequency in the vicinity of the wireless network. For
devices that operate in the 2.4GHz frequencies, this includes microwave ovens, some cordless phones and
Bluetooth devices.
The second category of attack is that which exploits the lack of verification of control frames in the wireless
network (Woodward 2004b). This control and management information is a broadcast in the clear by wireless
networks, and can be captured by an attacker using a freely available packet capture tool, such as Kismet
(Kershaw 2004). Once gathered this information can then be used against the wireless network that it was
captured from and used to disassociate or deauthenticate a valid client from the network (Bellardo and Savage
2003). The point of launching this attack is that the user is forced to rejoin the network, and during the
reassociation process, the user’s logon and authentication details can be captured. This information can then be
used to further exploit the wireless network. This type of attack can also be used to launch a man in the middle
attack against the wireless network, and can even be used to circumvent VPN systems. This type of attack is
probably one of the most concerning to IS managers as there appears to be no adequate means to prevent it from
occurring (Baird and Lynn 2002; Floeter 2003)
Injection of traffic
A new tool has been released which allows a malicious user to inject or insert traffic at the application layer
(Airpwn, 2004). The potential for misuse of this tool is great: the example used had pornographic images being
displayed on the screen of wireless users. While an attack of this nature is disturbing enough, and would cause
problems in most organisations with appropriate use policies, this is the least of what a tool such as this is

capable of. As stated by the creators, it could even be used to wipe hard drives. Fortunately, this tool only works
against open systems: implementation of WEP should be enough to prevent use of this tool against a wireless
network.
Rogue Access Points
These are access points that are set up using the MAC address and SSID of a valid AP. An attacker would firstly
use a DoS attack against he wireless client to force it to dissociate from the valid AP. The attackers AP is run at
higher power, and/or with a higher gain antenna so that when the client seeks to rejoin, it should go the AP with
the higher power level. The attacker would typically run a program such as Airsnarf (Shmoo 2005) which allows
such attacks to be carried out. Airsnarf is a simple rogue wireless access point setup utility designed to
demonstrate how a rogue AP can steal usernames and passwords from public wireless hotspots.
There are some tools such as Hotspotter that also fool clients into associating with them (Remote-exploit 2005).
Hotspotter passively monitors the network for probe request frames to identify the preferred networks of
Windows XP clients, and will compare it to a supplied list of common hotspot network names. If the probed
network name matches a common hotspot name, Hotspotter will act as an access point to allow the client to
authenticate and associate. Once associated, Hotspotter can be configured to run a command, possibly a script to
kick off a DHCP daemon and other scanning against the new victim.

THE SOLUTIONS
The security options available to protect the wireless network form the various types of measures listed above
will be classified into two groups: data security, and user authentication
Data security.
Data security addresses the problems with wireless networks that relate to encryption and protection of data on
the network. These include WEP with centralised encryption key servers, temporal key integrity protocol,
advanced encryption standard and virtual private networks.
WEP key servers.
The major problem with the use of WEP is that the private key is static. Because, the key is not changed
regularly, if at all, this makes it much easier for an attacker to derive or capture the private key. These are
centralised key encryption server makes it possible to have the key changed regularly, thereby reducing or
eliminating some of the risks of using the WEP system. Keys can be changed on a per packet, or per session
basis. Changing the key on a per packet basis adds significant overhead to the wireless network, and would
reduce throughput markedly. In most cases, the use of per session keys is sufficient.
Virtual private networks (VPN)
VPNs have long been used in a wired environment, usually to protect remote users dialling into a corporate
server. The added security of having all traffic pass through an encrypted tunnel makes provide access to the
corporate network, a viable option. When the problems with WEP become public, VPNs were widely adopted as
a means of securing wireless network traffic. However, if not implemented correctly, a tool such as crackerjack
from the air jack suite can be used to circumvent a VPN and the capture traffic via a man in the middle attack.
Due to recent additional security measures, added via WPA, the use of VPNs is on the decline.
Temporal key integrity protocol (TKIP)
Due to the perceived problems with wireless, and WEP in particular, a new system of security measures for
wireless networks was developed called Wi-Fi protected access (WPA). This system incorporated several
elements of the draft 802.11i security, the most notable feature being that of an inbuilt key rotation system, TKIP.
The use of this meant that the installation of additional servers to manage the task of key rotation became
unnecessary. It also means that it is an extremely difficult task for an attacker to crack or derive the key. All
wireless hardware built from the beginning of 2004 was required to support WPA if it wished to achieve Wi-Fi
certification. Many vendors have also released firmware updates for hardware built previous to this in order to
add support for WPA.
AES/CCMP
To further increase the security of wireless networks, an updated version of WPA was announced in September
2004, known as WPA2. This increases the security of wireless networks by incorporating additional features of
the IEEE 802.11i security protocol. In particular, it incorporated the use of the advanced encryption standard to

protect data. The AES/CCMP encryption system is generally acknowledged to be virtually unbreakable. There
are however, some drawbacks to the AES system. Most notable is the additional overhead required for
encryption and decryption. If the wireless device does not have the hardware capability to run the AES and is
forced to do it in software, then the wireless network would become unusable. Fortunately, most hardware
devices built in the last year does have hardware support for AES.
User authentication.
This second category of security measures includes MAC address filtering, SSID masking, and 802.1x / EAP.
These are means of verifying and establishing the identity of both client and access point, for the purposes of
creating and/or maintaining a valid connection.
MAC address filtering and SSID masking
MAC address filtering involves entering a list of MAC addresses, which are unique to every network device, into
the AP, or to a server (Maufer 2004). This means that only users with a MAC address on this list can connect to
the network. Additionally, the same MAC address cannot be used on the same network more than once. This
means that if someone was to capture a valid MAC address, they would not able to use it until such time as that
address isn't being used on the network. However, MAC addresses can be cloned or spoofed by a malicious user,
and valid users can be forcibly disconnected from the network because of the layer two vulnerabilities. MAC
address filtering is not intended to be a strong solution, but is one which should be used in most defence systems.
SSID masking makes it harder, but not impossible, for a malicious user to discover the AP. The term masking
refers to the process of removing the SSID from the beacon frames broadcast by the access point (Barken 2004).
The idea is that if an attacker does not have the SSID, then they cannot connect to the network. This solution is
not recommended to be used as much more than a basic deterrent, because the use of a tool such as Airjack
(Abaddon, 2003) makes it an easy task to discover a masked SSID. These measures will not stop a dedicated
attacker; they are simply intended to make an attempt to break into the wireless network more difficult.
RADIUS
This is a system of authentication which has been used for many years with wired systems. Originally developed
to authenticate dial up users to a corporate network, this authentication system has been adopted by wireless
network users, and is required for 802.1x authentication. It is a service which can run on an existing server, or a
dedicated server depending on user load. The level of technical expertise required and hardware costs mean that
this system is only likely to be appropriate for medium to large enterprise. However, there are some software
solutions that provide RADIUS like authentication which require very little user setup or even knowledge of how
the system works (Lucidlink 2005). The utility offered by Lucidlink can be obtained for no cost for a small
amount of users, making it a good solution of SOHO.
802.1x and EAP
The IEEE802.1x authentication system is a means for authenticating and controlling user access to a protected
network, as well as dynamically varying encryption keys. 802.1X works in conjunction with an extensible
authentication protocol (EAP) to both the wired and wireless LAN media (Edney and Arbaugh 2004). It supports
multiple authentication methods including Kerberos, one-time passwords, certificates, and public key
authentication. Client authentication with 802.1x works in the following manner (Wong 2003). Firstly, an
authenticated client attempts to connect to an access point. The access point opens a port which only allows EAP
packets to pass from client to an upstream authentication server. All other traffic is blocked until the client is
authenticated. If the client does success of dedicated there is allowed to pass traffic as per normal. There are many
different types of EAP, which can be used in conjunction with the 802.1x system. These include: protected EAP
(PEAP), lightweight EAP (LEAP), EAP with transport layer security (EAP-TLS), tunnelled transport layer security
(EAP-TTLS), and EAP message digest (EAP-MD-5) (Intel 2003). While each of these methods provides additional
security and compatibility, they do all have potential weaknesses, and provide different strength (Barken 2004).
The proprietary Cisco LEAP is probably the most vulnerable, as it is subject to offline dictionary attack (Wright
2004). Whilst all Cisco wireless equipment incorporates LEAP, its use is not recommended. The newest of the
methods mentioned is that of protected EAP, which was developed by both Microsoft and Cisco. This PEAP system
is recommended to be used with 802.1x to provide for user authentication in a wireless network. It should also be
noted that Windows XP provides native support for 802.1x and EAP.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A WIRELESS SECURITY POLICY
Listed here are some specific as to what procedures and policy should be put in place for different wireless users.
This is not exhaustive, but should allow for a wireless security policy to be put in place that protects the

organisation. Wireless security recommendations are provided for home, small business and enterprise, with
additional general recommendations provided for enterprise IS managers.
Home
The greatest danger to a home user is that of theft: leaving an AP open can allow someone to steal their internet
bandwidth. While not a major concern from a liability point, it is one of financial concern. The recommended
option for a home user is to implement shared key authentication at the very least. This is not recommended for
anyone concerned about data security because it does leave the WEP key vulnerable to discovery. However, if
the equipment being used has WPA equipped, then it will have a rolling key, making it very difficult for
someone to derive the WEP key (Wi-fi Alliance, 2003). What it does do is prevent a passer-by from being able to
immediately connect to, and use, the internet connection. In the majority of cases, this is enough to deter
someone who is likely to try this type of attack. However, in reality, all users should implement WPA security.
If the wireless equipment being used does not support WPA, then serious consideration should be given to
replacing it with WPA approved equipment. Other basic measures that should be taken by a home user include
masking the SSID (where possible), and also making use of MAC address filtering (Maufer 2004).
Small Business
In addition to bandwidth theft, small users such as real estate agents, medical professionals and small retailers are
exposing themselves to a potentially greater risk. If the signal from an AP that this type of business has setup is
accessible from a distance, then their data is not secure. Any sensitive data travelling the wireless segment is
available to anyone within range. If this data is of a sensitive nature, and it very likely is, then the person
operating the AP may be in breach of information privacy laws. Recommendation for this type of wireless user is
to implement the methods listed in the home section (above) provided that a rolling key is used. The use of a
VPN or even some sort of segregation of the network is also recommended. These last two measures may not
always be possible, as the technical and financial resources required may not be available.
Enterprise
Large organisations are less likely to have bandwidth stolen because they usually have the infrastructure in place
to ensure that users are authenticated before being allowed access to the internet. Authenticating to a RADIUS or
proxy server to gain access to network resources would normally be in place as part of their wired network, and
this can be extended to cover the WLAN. What larger organisations are at greater risk of is people stealing their
data. There are several recommendations for protecting the network for an enterprise. MAC address filtering can
still be of use even for enterprise, and is recommended. Strong mutual authentication, such as that provided by
802.1x / EAP, should be put in place. A VPN server may or may not be implemented, depending on what other
methods are in place. To further aid in the development of a wireless security policy for enterprise, the additional
recommendations are provided. They are summarised as: AP configuration; scanning for rogue APs and intrusion
detection systems; firewalls, segregation and wireless DMZs.
AP configuration
By connecting wireless equipment in default configuration, the individual or organisation leaves themselves open
to a number of risks. These include having traffic intercepted, which has a number of significant consequences,
injection of malicious traffic and denial of service (DoS) attacks. There is evidence that organisations, both large
and small, are in fact leaving themselves vulnerable by having unsecured WLANs. A survey of the Perth CBD in
2003 (Webb 2004) found a large number of APs installed by organisations with both the default SSID and no
WEP encryption being used. A more recent survey of the same area found that the total number of APs had
increased, with the number of unprotected APs being roughly the same (Yek and Bolan 2004). This gives
information to an attacker, and leaves the owner of that equipment vulnerable. It informs a malicious individual
that the rest of the configuration of the AP is likely to be default, and it indicates the manufacturer of the
equipment, which may also expose other flaws of that particular device. A large number of the APs detected had
no WEP authentication, meaning anyone would be able to connect to that network. The recommendation is to
change the SSID from the default, and to make it something which doesn’t easily identify the name or nature of
the business to an attacker.
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) and Scanning for Rogue APs
One major problem for large enterprise is the risk of staff attaching unauthorised APs to the company network.
The first step is to create policy which outlaws the use of wireless equipment unless it is setup by the
organisations IS staff. If not configured properly, this gives an attacker easy access to the network, allowing them
to bypass most security features that may be in place. Although a policy may be put in place, prohibiting the
connection of such a device to the network, this of course does not mean that employees will not do so. The

recommendation is that routine wireless scans be conducted in order to detect any devices in operation that
should not be present.
One way of making sure that rogue or unauthorised access points are discovered early is to use a wireless
intrusion detection system, or WIDS (Lim et al 2003). There are both commercial and freeware WIDS available,
but their effectiveness in protecting wireless networks is questionable (Valli 2004). They work by monitoring
wireless traffic and alerting system administrators to any unauthorised traffic or devices. However, these systems
do have drawbacks, and are only as good as the rules that determine what traffic is classified as legitimate or
unauthorised (Farshchi, 2003). If the rules are not strictly defined, then legitimate traffic can be classed as a
potential attack, particularly when clients signal strength is low. Another problem with these systems is that they
are a reactive system rather than an active, meaning that attacks are not prevented, but are reported after they
occur.
Firewalls, segregation and wireless DMZs
In the event that the access point or wireless network segment is compromised, it is important that this breach not
be allowed to expose the wired network. A basic level, this simply means connecting the access point to a
gateway to segregate it from the rest of the network. Another way to make sure this doesn't occur is to place the
access point behind a firewall, and only allow connection to the wired network through the use of a VPN. This
allows for additional monitoring of traffic passing from wireless to wired. The wireless demilitarised zone, or
WDMZ, is a means of totally compartmentalising and segregating the wireless portion of the network from the
wired (Planet3 Wireless 2002). Such a system would involve creating a separate network either physically, or
through the use of a VLAN, with all wireless equipment connected to this subnet. A separate DHCP server
should be used for this segment, and a user authentication method, such as 802.1x with EAP should also be
included.

CONCLUSION
Early adopters of wireless networks faced significant security threats, with little on offer to protect the network
from attacks. The last few years have seen many new security features and solutions offered by various vendors,
including WPA, WPA2 and 802.11i. Although there are now many security solutions on offer for wireless
networks, the difficulty can lie in deciding which of the available measures is appropriate for the Information
Security manager to implement. In addition to having to secure and monitor an IT infrastructure, IS managers
now face the additional task of having to secure a part of the network which is inherently vulnerable. The initial
security measures available to users of wireless networks, such as MAC address filtering and SSID masking, are
only appropriate for small business or home users. More advanced means of protecting wireless network, such
as a VPN, TKIP, and strong mutual authentication, are recommended for medium to large enterprise. This paper
has attempted to aid in the task of developing and implementing an appropriate wireless network security policy,
by analysing current threats and solutions, and providing recommendations based on those aspects.
Whilst the solutions and recommendations given in this paper will aid IS managers in developing policy to
secure the network, none of the solutions are absolute. Each of the measures given here still has a flaw of one
sort or another. Although the risk associated with some of the more robust solutions, such as 802.1x / EAP, is
extremely small, it is important to note that in certain circumstances its security can be compromised.
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